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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHWEST
REGARDING INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
ROBERT D. DELLWO*

BACKGROUND
On January 1, 1977, tribal attorneys and their departmental
counterparts believed they understood the Winters doctrine' of
Indian water rights. The writer, as attorney for three tribes, could
comfortably predict the direction of his cases and speak with some
confidence on the future of Indian water rights law. The Lummi
Tribe in western Washington was effectively winning its tribal water
rights suit in the case of United States v. Bel Bay Community &
Water Association.2 On March 6, 1978, United States District Judge
Donald S. Voorhees had entered a partial summary judgment holding
the state of Washington did not have jurisdiction on the Lummi
Reservation to issue water permits to non-Indians. He had said in his
order on the tribe's motion for summary judgment:
The court finds as a practical matter that if the ground and surface
waters within the external boundaries of the Lummi Indian Reservation are to be scientifically and soundly managed, that management
must be concentrated in the hands of a single entity ... (which)
cannot be exercised by the State of Washington ... but must be
exercised either by the Secretary of the Interior, or
by the Lummi
3
Indian Tribe or perhaps by the two acting together.
The Colville Tribes on the Colville Reservation were well along in
the case of Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton.4 Judge Marshall
Neill had been informed of the opinion in Bel Bay. The tribal attorneys were confident that, with the even more favorable law and facts
in the Colville case, Judge Neill would rule similarly.
The Spokane Tribe was guardedly optimistic about its case en*A practicing lawyer in Spokane, Washington, who has represented several tribes in the
Northwest for several years. His personal specialties are water law and Indian law.
1. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The Winters case and its successors
held that the United States, by withdrawing the land of an Indian reservation from the
public domain and reserving it for the use and benefit of the tribe, reserved unappropriated
waters appurtenant to the reservation and to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation.
2. [1978] 5 INDIAN L. REP. (AILTP) §F-43 (W.D. Wash. March 6, 1978).
3. Id. § F-44.

4. 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
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titled United States v. Anderson' (referred to herein as Chamokane).
Plaintiff's briefs and oral argument had placed great reliance on the
Bel Bay decision. During oral argument on Chamokane, Judge Neill
discussed Bel Bay and stated that, while he knew there were motions
to reconsider, "there probably was little chance of the judge reversing his own opinion."
Only recently the author met another tribal attorney at a conference on Indian water rights and was greeted with the expletive OYK!
When asked what OYK meant the author was told: "OLIPHANT,
YAKIMA AND KNEIP," referring to the three Supreme Court decisions: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,6 Washington v. Yakima
Indian Nation,I and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip. 8 These three
cases, which are discussed below, and the judicial pattern that generated them, have totally changed the legal environment of every
pending Indian water rights case since early 1977.
In 1971 the author wrote a law review article9 in which he optimistically discussed the classic Winters doctrine cases (Winters, Conrad, Walker, River, Ahtanum and Arizona1 0) with discussions as to
what could be expected concerning reserved Indian water rights.' 1
The article concluded:
The [Winters] Doctrine, although originally concerned with the nonIndian farmer's unconscionable appropriation of the "quantity" of
water, must be further developed, in proportion to the expansion of
Tribal goals, to combat the ever increasing unconscionable appropriation of the "quality" of water by industry, cities, and agriculture. The Tribes will go to the courts again to seek decisions which,
hopefully, will enforce the Winters Doctrine not only in the protection of the rights of irrigation, but for any other beneficial use of
water, which now appears to have an even higher quality and
priority.1 2

These briefly stated tribal goals were "ho-hums" when published in
1971. Today they are like Jason's quest for the golden fleece, to be
5. No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979). The writer herein is attorney for the Spokane
Tribe, Intervenor Plaintiffs.
6. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
7. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
8. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
9. Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-The Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 GONZ. L REV. 215
(1971).
10. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), appeal
after remand, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.,
104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
11. See Dellwo, supra note 9, at 227.
12. Id at 240.
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fought for and attained despite engulfing hazards on the way. As
United States Supreme Court decisions adverse to tribal positions are
posited one by one, they assume a pattern, a common denominator
of assimilationist views. These views already are affecting trial court
attitudes throughout the West.
DECOTEAU TO KNEIP
Most of the northwest tribes were victims of the allotmenthomestead-land sales sequence which checkerboarded their reservations with non-Indian lands and filled them with thriving, competitive, land-hungry, non-Indian citizens. The writer's father, for
instance, homesteaded on the Flathead Reservation in Montana when
most of the reservation's fertile core of 500,000 acres went into
non-Indian ownership. Most allotments remaining among the homesteads were bought up.
The Coeur d'Alene Reservation, declining from a 550,000-acre
reservation established by executive order in 1873' ' to 390,000
acres in the Land Cession of 1889,1 through the process of allotments, homesteads and Indian land sales, was reduced to less than
75,000 acres of Indian land. But the tribes were confident the nonIndian lands remained "reservation lands." They based this view for
the most part on the statutory definition of "Indian Country," '1 the
Supreme Court's own findings in Mattz v. Arnett, 1 6 and especially in
the Colville case of Seymour v. Superintendent. '7 But in 1975 the
Supreme Court, in DeCoteau v. District County Court,' 8 held the
homesteaded portions of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation,
located in South Dakota, had been disestablished (terminated) as
portions of the reservation.
The Coeur d'Alene Tribe had lost two-thirds of its reservation to
the homesteaders. It was encouraged by DeCoteau, though, because
of the Supreme Court allusion to the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's 1889
Cession Agreement, 1 9 wherein the tribe, prior to homestead entries
in the south two-thirds of the reservation, ceded the north one-third
of the reservation, and unlike the Lake Traverse Reservation, left the
rest of the reservation intact. The Court noted that the agreement
contained the same "words of cession" as did the Lake Traverse
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES 837 (1904).
Id at 422.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976).
412 U.S. 481 (1973).
368 U.S. 351 (1962).
420 U.S. 425 (1975).
See KAPPLER, supra note 13, at 422, 837.
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cession of land to be homesteaded, 2 0 so the Coeur d'Alene Reservation seemed exempt from DeCoteau. This confidence, shared by
other northwest tribes with homestead statutes and probclamations
was shattered
similar to those affecting the Coeur d'Alene 2 Tribe,
1
with the case of Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.
The Supreme Court in Kneip reduced the territory of the Rosebud
Sioux Reservation by 75 percent. The tribe confidently had pointed
out that its so-called cession agreement had never been approved by
Congress, hence differing from DeCoteau, and there had been no
tribal cession for a fixed sum of money. The Supreme Court, in
answering this contention, held:
[W] e conclude that although the Acts of 1904, 1907 and 1910 were
unilateral Acts of Congress without the consent of three-fourths of
the members as required by the original treaty, that fact does not
have any direct bearing on the question of whether Congress by
these later acts did intend to diminish the Reservation boundaries. 2 2
Justice Marshall, followed by Justices Brennan and Stewart, leaped
to dissent saying: "The Court holds today that in 1904, 1907, and
1910, Congress broke solemn promises it had made to the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe and took from them without any guarantee of compensation three-quarters of their Reservation." 2 3
The majority briefly cited Mattz and Seymour, but it would
appear that Kneip was not decided on the basis of the applicable case
law precedents. Instead the decision was based on the assimilationist
view of the Court that portions of reservations that are overwhelmingly non-Indian in both population and land ownership should be
disestablished.
The dissent pointed out that the applicable statutes were virtually
identical to those construed in Seymour and Mattz and concluded:
"Because I can find no principled justification for inflicting manifold
injuries on the Rosebud Sioux Indians and for jeopardizing the rights
of numerous other Tribes, I respectfully dissent." 2 4
Few dissents express such outrage, such emphatic difference of
opinion from the majority. Unfortunately, it is the majority opinion
that rules and the attitude exemplified by the Court in Kneip seemed
to presage the Court's later decisions in Oliphant v. Suquamish In20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

420 U.S. 425, 446 (1975).
430 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 615-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 633 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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dian Tribe,2" California v. United States,2 6 and United States v.
New Mexico2 7 in 1978 and Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation2 8
in 1979.
OLIPHANT TO BEL BA Y
As I mentioned earlier, in 1977 the Lummi Tribe thought it was
winning its Bel Bay water rights case. 2 9 The United States District
Court of Western District of Washington had held that the state of
Washington had no jurisdiction to issue water permits, even to theoretically surplus waters on the Lummi Reservation. The judge in the
Colville's Walton and the Spokane's Chamokane3 0 case seemed certain to follow Bel Bay.
Then the United States Supreme Court decision in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe3 reversed favorable rulings of the lower
courts by holding tribal courts did not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians. Two weeks later the Supreme
Court, as if to emphasize it had not stripped tribes of their sovereign
powers in Oliphant, upheld tribal sovereignty concerning its own
affairs in United States v. Wheeler3 I stating: "But our cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty.
We have recently said: 'Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory .... I I
Thus the assimilationist Court was emphatically signaling that
tribes had jurisdiction over Indians but not over non-Indians. Tribal
advisers were quick to point out Oliphant dealt only with criminal
jurisdiction and that probably in selected matters, the tribes would
have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.
OLIPHANT AND ZONING
As late as two months before Oliphant, a federal district court
held in Trans-Canada Enterprise, Ltd v. Muckleshoot Indian
Tribes3 4 that the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe had zoning authority
25. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
26. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
27. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
28. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
29. The tribe had obtained a partial summary judgment. See notes 2 & 3 supra and
accompanying text.
30. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978);
United States v. Anderson, No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979).
31. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
32. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
33. Id at 323, quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
34. [19781 5 INDIAN L. REP. (AILTP) §F-153 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 1978).
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and jurisdiction over private land owned by Trans-Canada. But following Oliphant, the trial court judge reversed his earlier opinion.
Excerpts from his memorandum opinion highlight the importance of
Oliphant. The court said: "Only in the recent Oliphant decision has
the question been addressed as to whether a tribe may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. Oliphant dealt with a tribe's criminal jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court's analysis of a tribe's inherent
power is of particular significance in non-criminal situations as
well." 3 The court added, "In light of Oliphant, this Court finds that
the defendant tribe does not have jurisdiction to regulate the activity
of those outside its tribal community absent affirmative delegation
of such power by Congress." 3 6 The court then set aside its original
order of January 4, 1978, "as having been improvidently granted. -37
THE BEL BA Y RECONSIDERATION
The briefs of the attorneys in the Spokane Tribal Chamokane
case 3 8 and the Colville's Walton 3 9 case were sprinkled with references to the earlier decisions of Trans-Canadaand Bel Bay. After the
Oliphant decision and the Trans-Canada reversal, Judge Voorhees
reversed himself in Bel Bay, stating:
[T] he Court is of the opinion that its order of March 3, 1978,
granting partial summary judgment, was improvidently granted and
that the Court should reserve its ruling as to the power or lack of
power of the State of Washington to exercise jurisdiction over any
portion of the ground waters found within the external boundaries
Indian Reservation until this matter can be tried on its
of the Lummi
40
merits.

While we will discuss the Colville Tribe's Walton case below, we
pause to note here that one month after the Judge Voorhees'
changed opinion of September 26, 1978, Judge Marshall Neill held in
the Walton case:
[T] he state's issuance of permits for appropriation of excess waters
on the Reservation does not invade power preempted by federal
legislation and does not infringe on the Tribe's right to self government. The court therefore holds that the State of Washington has
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id §F-155.
Id.
Id (emphasis added).
No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979).
460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
[1978] 5 INDIAN L. REP. (AILTP) §F-198, 198 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 1978).
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jurisdiction over non-reserved waters within the Colville Reservation
and that the Colville Tribal Water Code must be limited to regulation
of reserved waters. 4 1

THE EROSION OF RESERVED RIGHTS
We have described the erosive impact on northwestern tribal water
rights cases in the DeCoteau-Kneip series of United States Supreme
Court decisions concerning territorial jurisdiction and in the Oliphant
series of cases involving personal jurisdiction. What about the Winters
rights themselves? In early 1978 we would have predicted their
judicial expansion, open-ended as they were, to recreation, esthetics,
fisheries, water quality, commerical needs and, with great logic, into
every beneficial need and use the various tribes might have for the
water.
The author argued in the Chamokane case that if the intent of the
Spokane Reservation was to contain the Indians and yet change their
habits so they could someday become a viable social and economic
force, then Winters must be asserted to give them a means to that
end. If the means was in the water (as it manifestly was) then the
tribe must retain and the United States Government must reserve for
them the necessary uses of the water, which included instream benefits for the tribe's recreation, esthetics, and fisheries.
In preparing briefs for the Chamokane case in early 1978, we cited
the classic Winters cases 4 2 and various other cases analogizing Winters rights to other federal reserved rights. Included in the citations
was Cappaert v. United States4 1 which extended these federal reserved rights to ground waters to preserve the pup fish. 4 We were
not worried when the Washington State Department of Ecology, in
its Chamokane brief, quoted only that portion of the Cappaertopinion which said, "The implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine,
however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purpose of the reservation, no more."' I

But we had not anticipated the consequences of the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Californiav. United
States4 6 and United States v. New Mexico,4 7 both issued July 3,
1978. Instead we looked to a number of federal cases which had
41. 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
42. See note 10 supra.

43. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
44. Id at 142.

45. Id at 141.
46. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).

47. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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applied and extended the concept of tribal Winters rights to all kinds
of federal reservations and enclaves. In FPC v. Oregon,4
the
Supreme Court had held the United States had reserved lands with a
river running through them "for power purposes."'4 9 In Shamberger
v. United States the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the United
States had reserved whatever water was needed to provide a water
supply for a military depot.' 0 Not only did Arizona v. California"1
reaffirm the Supreme Court's Winters ruling, but it held:
[The] United States intended to reserve water sufficient for the
future requirements of Lake Mead National Recreational Area, the
Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife
Refuge and the Gila National Forest. s2
An Idaho case, Soderman v. Kackley," 3 dealt with the question of
the water rights reserved by the United States in the creation of the
Caribou National Forest in 1907. It held:
The United States is entitled under the reservation doctrine to its
claim of non-consumptive use to the entire natural flow of the three
streams in question . . . since it has been shown that such use is

required for the purposes for which the reservation was created,
namely protection of watersheds, maintenance of natural flows in
streams below the watersheds, production of timber, domestic uses,
administrative site uses, production of forage for domestic animals,
stock grazing and watering, protection and propagation of wildlife,
recreational uses by the public, fire fighting and prevention, preservation of fish cultures, and esthetic and other public values.5 4
This case reached the Idaho Supreme Court as Avondale Irrigation
District v. North Idaho Properties, Inc."s The Idaho court, apparently anticipating the United States Supreme Court decision in
5 7 not in the
United States v. New Mexico," 6 cited Cappaert,
liberal
manner used by tribal lawyers, but as follows: "[A] s the Supreme
Court made clear in Cappaert, the United States is entitled to such a
water right ... only to the extent it 'is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more.' ", 8
48. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
49. Id. at 444.
50. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).

51. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
52. Id at 601.
53. 97 Idaho 850, 555 P.2d 390 (1976) (dissmissing appeal).

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at 851-52, 555 P.2d at 391-92.
99 Idaho 30, 577 P.2d 9 (1978).
438 U.S. 696 (1978).
426 U.S. 128 (1976).

58. Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 99 Idaho 30, 35, 577 P.2d

9, 14 (1978).
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The Idaho court then proceeded to limit the purposes of the Caribou National Forest to "the purposes of timber and watershed protection"' 9 and held that the United States was entitled to waters
"necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the reservations
were originally created-no more and no less. "6 0 The Avondale case
had a state court adjudicating federal reserved rights by virtue of the
McCarran Amendment. 6 1 The court took the narrowest possible
view of "purposes" of national forests and emphasized, quoting
Cappaert, that the United States had reserved rights to achieve those
narrow purposes and no more. Could we expect better from the
United States Supreme Court? We were holding our breath for the
6
expected Supreme Court decision in United States v. New Mexico, 2
which came on July 3, 1978.
That New Mexico case was almost a carbon copy of the Avondale
case. Each dealt with the extent of federal reserved or Winters rights
to water in a national forest. In New Mexico the Supreme Court
narrowly read the "purposes" of the Gila National Forest, as did the
Idaho court, as limited to "conserv[ing] the water flows and to
furnish[ing] a continuous supply of timber for the people." '6 1 All
other purposes were secondary and not included in reserved rights.
The Court concluded:
Congress intended that water would be reserved only where necessary to preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows for
private and public uses under state law. This intent is revealed in the
purposes for which the national forest system was created and Congress' principled deference to state water law in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 and other legislation. The decision of the
supreme court of the State of New Mexico is faithful to this congressional intent and is therefore affirmed."
59. Id. at 38, 577 P.2d at 17.
60. Id (emphasis added).
61. 43 U.S.C. §666 (1976) (also known as McCarran Water Rights Suit Act); see also
Note, Implied Reservation Claims After Cappaert v. United States, [1977] ARIZ. ST. L. J.
647. The McCarran Act provides: "Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States
is owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state law,
by purchase, exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
The United States, when a party to any such suit, shah (1) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the state laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amendable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and
decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided,That no
judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit."
62. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
63. Id at 707.
64. Id at 718.
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State attorneys general were quick to furnish copies of this decision to federal district judges in yet undecided tribal water rights
cases. Tribal lawyers pointed out the obvious distinction, that an
Indian reservation with its broad purposes as a homeland is more
like a national park system than a national forest, which has comparatively narrow purposes. The tribes also took satisfaction in the
well-worded dissent of Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall. Powell said:
I do not agree ... that the forests which Congress intended to

"improve and protect" are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned
by the Court. . . . [T] he forests consist of the birds, animals and

fish-the wildlife-that inhabit them, as well as the trees, flowers,
shrubs, and grasses. I therefore would hold that the United States is
entitled to so much water as is6 necessary to sustain the wildlife of
the forests, as well as the plants. s
New Mexico must be read in the light of California v. United
States, 66 published by the Supreme Court the same day as New
Mexico. This case effectively subjected U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
projects to California's water code and water permit process. The
Court said in that case: "A principal motivating factor behind Congress' decision to defer to state law was ... the legal confusion that
would arise if federal water law and state water law reigned side by
side in the same locality." '6 As in the New Mexico case, Justices
White, Brennan, and Marshall were apprehensive of, if not appalled
by, the majority opinion in California,stating in their dissent:
Our cases that the Court now discards are relatively recent decisions
dealing with an issue of statutory construction and with a subject
matter that is under constant audit by Congress ... [and] ...

[o] nly the revisionary zeal of the present majority can explain its
misreading of our cases and its evident willingness to disregard them;
Congress has not disturbed these cases ...I would respect them ...

and in none
all of the relevant cases are contrary to today's
6 8 holding,
of them was the court on a frolic of its own.
The tenor of these and the other cited Supreme Court cases seems
always to be conciliatory and deferent to concurrent or co-existing
state law but minimizing and assimilationist of Indian law and jurisdiction. It seems as if the Court majority has decided to ignore precedent and to seek a jurisdictional, territorial, and subject matter pat65.
66.
67.
68.

dissenting).
Id at 719 (Powell, J.,
438 U.S. 645 (1978).
Id at 668-69.
Id.at 692-93 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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tern strengthening state jurisdiction over Indian affairs in areas
which, until recently, were the concern and legal responsibility of the
federal sovereign. 6 9 If tribes only could transform the dissents in all
these recent cases into the majority opinions, there would be little if
any question about the outcome of the many Indian water rights
cases presently being considered by the lower courts.
McCARRAN AMENDMENT
As will be discussed in detail below, all the pending northwest
tribal water cases are directly affected by the recent Supreme Court
decisions in the Kneip" I series (concerning territorial jurisdiction),
the Oliphant7 1 series (personal jurisdiction), and the New MexicoCalifornia series (state jurisdiction), all of which further the assimilationist views of the Supreme Court. This view received its most
emphatic avowal in Yakima, 2 discussed below.
We now reach the A kin series of cases which essentially gave state
courts the right to adjudicate federal water rights, including Indian
rights, by virtue of the McCarran Amendment.7 3 The primary and
landmark case is formally cited as Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States and Akin v. United States, 4 but is
usually known as Akin.
The earlier cases in the series (United States v. District Court for
Eagle County," and United States v. District Court for Water Division No. 576 ), held that the McCarran Amendment gave state courts
the jurisdiction to adjudicate federal water rights to the use of water
in a river basin, but left unclear whether tribal Winters rights were
included in those federal rights. Akin settled this question to the
detriment of the Indians. The Supreme Court held in Akin that state
courts have jurisdiction over Indian water rights under the amendment. The Court added: "Thus, bearing in mind the ubiquitous
nature of Indian water rights in the Southwest, it is clear that a
construction of the Amendment excluding those [Indian] rights
from its coverage would enervate the Amendment's objective. ' '
Then the Court opined:
'

69. See Beaton, Breathing New Life Into Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, California v. United States, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 207 (1979).
70. 430 U.S. 583 (1977).
71. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).

72. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
73. See 43 U.S.C. §666 (1976) and note 57 supra.
74. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).

75. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
76. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
77. 424 U.S. 800, 811 (1976).
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Mere subjection of Indian rights to legal challenge in state court,
however, would no more imperil those rights than would a suit
brought by the Government in district court. ... The government
has not abdicated any responsibility fully to defend Indian rights in
state court, and Indian interests
may be satisfactorily protected
78
under regimes of state law.

This, as tribal lawyers know from experience, is wishful thinking.
Again in this case the dissent, written by Justice Stewart joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, rang true and clear. Stewart commented, "The precedents cited by the Court .

..

not only fail to

support the Court's decision in this case, but expressly point in the
79
opposite direction."
Harold Ranquist of the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the
Interior, prepared a memorandum to the United States Solicitor discussing this case. He began: "The case of Colorado River Water Conservancy District et al v. United States hangs like the sword of
Damocles over proceedings to determine the measure of reserved
water rights of reservations for which the Department of Interior is
responsible."I Like Justice Stewart, he found little legal precedent
for the majority opinion but then pointed out:
While the dissenting opinions appear to be cogently argued and support the position of the United States the fact remains that the

decision of the court is binding and this department is faced with the
potential adjudication of all the water rights of its reservations and
the various Indian reservations in the state courts in these states west
of the Mississippi. 8 1
82
AFTERMATH OF AKIN

The deluge of cases predicted by Ranquist has begun. There are
state court adjudications of tribal water rights proliferating in both
the Southwest and the Northwest. In Reynolds v. Lewis, 3 New
78. Id at 812.
79. Id at 823 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
80. Internal Office Memoranda, Dep't of Interior (Dec. 6, 1976).
81. Id.
82. See Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of
Federal Jurisdiction: the Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1978); Palma,
Indian Water Rights: A State Perspective After Akin, 57 NEB. L. REV. 295 (1978); Note,
State Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations, Moe v. ConfederatedSalish and Kootenai Tribes,
425 U.S. 463 (1976), 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1035 (1978); Note, State Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate Indian Reserved Water Rights, 18 NAT. RES. J. 221 (1978).
83. 88 N.M. 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976). The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the lower court's determination with instructions to reinstate the case upon the
trial court's docket. The trial court had dismissed the United States as a defendant for lack
of jurisdiction of the state courts to adjudicate the reserved water rights of the Mescalero
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Mexico is adjudicating the water rights of the Mescalero Apache.
State adjudications involving Indian water rights have been initiated
involving the San Juan River and the Salt River. In the Northwest we
hear of the Adair case involving the Klamaths.
In detailed litigation, the Yakima Indian Nation finds its rights in
the Yakima River Valley being adjudicated in the case of State v.
Acquavala.8 4 Tribal rights on the Wind River in Wyoming also are
being litigated.
THE COURTHOUSE RACE
Since Akin each northwest state has been reviewing its laws and
policies in preparation for state court litigation of Indian water
rights. The most controversial scenario has occurred in Montana,
where the legislature recently enacted legislation needed to enable it
to begin McCarran Amendment adjudications of tribal water rights
involving most of the principal Montana watersheds. 8 I This legislation was enacted to provide for the adjudication of Indian water
rights in state courts. In anticipation of this enactment the Justice
Department and the Office of the Solicitor filed four suits in the
Montana United States District Court: United States v. AMS Ranch,
Inc. 8 6 ; United States v. Aasheim8 . United States v. Abell8 8; United
States v. Aageson. 8 9
The AMS Ranch case sought to adjudicate the water rights in the
Marias River System for the Blackfeet Tribe, Glacier National Park,
the Lewis and Clark National Forest, and the United States Bureau
of Reclamation. The Aasheim case involved the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes and sought adjudication of tribal Winters rights in the Poplar River Basin and the Big
Muddy Creek system. The Abell case involved the Flathead Indian
Reservation of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes. Adjudication of the tribal rights to surface and ground waters was sought.
Apache Indian Reservation. The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the McCarran
Amendment granted to all states jurisdiction to adjudicate federally reserved water rights,
including those reserved for Indians.
84. No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash. Superior Ct. Yakima Country Jan. 15, 1979). The case was
remanded and ordered tried in state court in a grant of the plaintiff's motion in U.S. District
Court, No. C-77-347 (E.D. Wash., filed January 2, 1979). (The case is cited phonetically as
the "Aqua-Valla.")
85. An Act to Adjudicate Claims of Existing Water Rights in Montana ch. 697 1979
Mont. Laws 1901.
86. No. CV79-22-BLG (D. Mont., filed Apr. 5, 1979).
87. No. CV79-40-BLG (D. Mont., filed Apr. 5, 1979).
88. No. CV79-3M (D. Mont., filed Apr. 5, 1979).
89. No. CV79-21GF (D. Mont., filed Apr. 5, 1979).
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Also involved in Abell are the reserved rights of the Flathead Indian
Irrigation project, the National Bison Range, Glacier National Park,
the Flathead National Forest, the Lolo National Forest, various tribal
and non-tribal power sites, a number of private power interests, the
Bureau of Reclamation Hungry Horse Dam project, and other federal
reservations and interests.
The Aageson case involved the Blackfeet Tribe and the Chippewa
and Cree Tribes of the Rocky Boy's Reservation, the Sioux and
Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, the Gross Ventre
and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation on the Milk
River (made famous in the original Winters case) and the St. Mary
River systems. Various federal bird and wildlife refuges and other
federal facilities and reservations also were named.
It is apparent that the four suits affect all areas of the state of
Montana. Thousands of defendants have gathered to do battle against
the tribal water rights. Headlines from just one issue of the Billings,
Montana, Gazette are indicative of the forthcoming battle:
WATER BATTLE-FIGHT FOR RIGHTS BETWEEN STATE,
INDIANS NO LONGER PROVINCIAL ISSUE
RAMIREZ IS "VILLAIN" IN WATER RAID
INDIAN STALL TACTICS TO COST ALL MONTANA-RAMIREZ
NEW BILL WOULD LIMIT IN-STREAM ALLOCATIONS
TO 50% OF YEARLY FLOW
WATER TALKS OFFERED; NO COMPROMISE ON SUITS 9 0
A staff editorial refers to the Winters case as "coming alive after
70 years" and as a "smoldering battle between Indian and white
water users."'" Representative Jack Ramirez, minority floor leader
in the State House of Representatives, is quoted as saying "the
vague 'Winters Doctrine' would allow the Indian Tribes to claim
every last drop of water that flows through their reservations."
Regarding the need for state adjudications he was quoted as saying,
"How can we certify the water right of an irrigator here when an
Indian Tribe upstream may later decide to take all the water before it
gets to him and leave him none." 9 2
After May 15, 1979, when Montana's Senate Bill 76 became effective enabling that state to begin McCarran Amendment adjudications of tribal water rights, the State of Montana moved to dismiss
each of the foregoing cases and the three others with which they
90. Billings Gazette, Apr. 11, 1979.

91. Id.
92. Id.
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were consolidated. On November 26, 1979, in a single consolidated
decision affecting all of the cases, U.S. District Judges James F.
Battin and Paul G. Hatfield granted the motions and dismissed them
all. The judges found that the McCarran Amendment "gave consent
to jurisdiction in the state courts concurrent with jurisdiction in the
federal courts over cases involving federal rights to the use of water."
The judges stated that while "this Court recognizes that it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant actions under
Section 1345, it nonetheless finds merit in the State's motion to
dismiss."
The judges expressed fears that the consolidated cases could "exhaust" the federal judicial resources of Montana and "on the basis of
wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources" dismissed all seven in favor of adjudications in state
courts.
With this judicial setback to the cases, unless overturned on appeal, it is doubtful that the adjudications in question will ever be
litigated in either state or federal court.
Events similar to those reported in the Billings Gazette are occurring all over the West. A knowledgeable Indian leader, viewing all
this, said: "We have the President's water policy of quantification
and negotiation, the Akin case giving the states jurisdiction, the
states rushing to their courts. They call this assimilation. I call it
annihilation." Many tribal lawyers agree.
WASHINGTON v. YAKIMA INDIAN NATION
In 1978 all tribal attorneys in all Indian cases, especially the Walton9 3 and the Chamokane9 4 cases, were able to cite the Ninth Circuit decision in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation9" striking
down WASH. REV. CODE § § 37.12.010-.070 (the partial assumption of state criminal and civil jurisdiction on Indian reservations
under Public Law 83-280) as violative of the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution. 9 6 The strong argument the Ninth
Circuit made against piecemeal and tract-by-tract jurisdiction was an
answer to the position of the state of Washington in the Bel Bay, I9
Walton, and Chamokane cases, that the tribes could exercise jurisdic93. 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
94. No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979).
95. 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).

96. WASH. REV. CODE § § 37.12.010-.070 (1974) extend total state jurisdiction to all
non-Indian lands and to eight listed items including Juvenile Delinquency, Domestic Relations, and Traffic On Public Highways.
97. [1978] 5 INDIAN L. REP. (AILTP) §F-43 (W.D. Wash. March 6, 1978).
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tion only over Indian water rights on Indian lands but the state

should continue to hold the jurisdiction over non-Indian water rights
on the same reservation.
On January 16, 1979, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Yakima '8 The Court said, in effect,
that partial jurisdiction asserted by the state on the reservations of
non-consenting tribes reflects a responsible attempt to accommodate
both state and tribal interests and is consistent with the concerns
that "underlay the adoption of Pub. L. 280."19 The Court brushed
aside the opinion of the Ninth Circuit on the checkerboard pattern
of jurisdiction stating:
The lines the State has drawn may well be difficult to administer.
But they are no more or less so than many of the classifications that
pervade the law of Indian jurisdiction. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 386 U.S. 351; Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463.
. ..In short, checkerboard jurisdiction is not 0novel in Indian law,
and does not, as such, violate the Constitution.' 0

In retrospect this decision appears as a building block in a series of
Supreme Court decisions that are effectuating the assimilationist
policies of the United States Government toward Indian tribes,
especially in the fields of jurisdiction. This assimilationist trend is at
the core of recent Indian water rights decisions.
The court in Yakima refers to this policy repeatedly: "It [Public
Law 83-2801 was also, however, without question reflective of the
general assimilationist policy followed by Congress from the early

1950's through the late 1960's."' 01 The Court continued with this
98. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
99. Id. at 498; Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (now
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976) and other scattered sections
in 18, 28 U.S.C.). "In 1953 Congress attempted a comprehensive resolution of the question
of state jurisdiction over Indians. Public Law 280, as this legislation is generally called, was
heavily influenced by the termination and assimilation policy. Yet, it did not represent a
wholesale abandonment of Indians to the states. Some elements of federal protection were
maintained. In five states, the Act mandated the transfer of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over reservation Indians to the state. Other states were given the option of assuming such
civil and criminal jurisdiction. However, the Act contained limitations on the jurisdiction thus
transferred, and significantly, it did not terminate the trust status of reservation lands."
AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW F-1
(1976). The entire text of the act itself is found at footnote 9 of the Court's opinion, 439
U.S. at 471 n. 9.
100. 439 U.S. at 502.
101. Id.at 488. "That policy was formally announced in H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat.
B132, approved on July 27, 1953, the same day that Pub. L. 280 was passed by the House.
99 Cong. Rec. 9968 (1953). As stated in H.R. Con. Res. 108, the policy of Congress was 'as
rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are
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concept and in a footnote summarized it further, saying: "That Congress intended to facilitate assimilation when it authorized a transfer
of jurisdiction from the Federal Government to the States does not
necessarily mean, however, that it intended in Pub. L. 280 to terminate tribal self-government." ' 02 Later in the opinion the Court
noted, "Pub. L. 280 was intended to facilitate, not to impede, the
transfer of jurisdictional responsibility."' 03
COL VILLE CONFEDERA TED TRIBES v. WALTON
It was during the backwash from these Supreme Court cases that
Judge Marshall Neill on October 25, 1978, published his Memorandum Opinion in the case of Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton. I4 Walton involved a small creek that flowed intermittently
through hundreds of acres of Colville tribal land and the Walton
farm. At issue were the tribe's Winters rights for irrigation, its jurisdiction and right to protect the creek as an esthetic resource, and its
right to use the creek as a spawning bed for its trout. Also at issue
was whether Walton, in addition to possible appropriative rights
under state law, had rights as a successor to Indian allottees. The
tribe also claimed that it and the Department of Interior had exclusive jurisdiction over the water rights, both Indian and non-Indian.
The Walton court, faced with the plethora of jurisdictional cases
cited above and the judicial erosion of non-tribal federal reserved
rights, ruled in favor of the tribe on tribal Winters rights. The court
found that approximately 1,000 acre feet of water were available for
irrigation and that the tribe, having shown a "present need," had
prior and paramount Winters rights for the irrigation of its lands to
two-thirds of that amount.1 I 5 While the Walton judge awarded the
balance of the available water to Walton, the non-Indian permittee,
he also upheld the priority of the tribal Winters rights.
On the issue of the Lahontan cutthroat trout in Omak Lake, the
court indicated that the tribe had Winters rights for the use of water
for the production of fish, saying: "The Colville Reservation was set
aside as a homeland for the Indians; therefore the reservation of
water sufficient to raise crops and provide food must be implied.
Fish was a traditional food source of Washington Indians.' 1 06 But
applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United
States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizen-

ship ....... 439 U.S. at 488 n. 32.
102. Id. at 489 n. 32.

103. Id at 490.
104. 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978).

105. Id at 1330.
106. Id
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following the principle of "current need" he commented that the
Lahonton trout "are presently being propagated successfully in a
federal hatchery ...and made available to the Tribe.... Therefore,
a reservation of water for such use will not be implied at this
time."1 0 7
But the Walton court, faced with the questions of jurisdiction (post
Oliphant' 08 and post the final ruling of Bel Bay' 09 ), held that the
state had jurisdiction as to any waters "surplus" to the tribal reserved
waters. The judge validated the Walton state permits for the amount
of excess waters found available.
Thus the Walton court, bowing to the trends in the United States
Supreme Court, was assimilationist on questions of jurisdiction, but
strongly traditional in its recognition of basic Winters rights.
THE CHAMOKANE DECISION
While writing this article, the author, attorney for the Spokane
Indian Tribe, was awaiting the decision in the case of United States v.
Anderson' 'I (the Chamokane case) wherein the Spokane Tribe was
plaintiff in intervention. The tribe and the United States were litigating the water rights of the Spokane Tribe on Chamokane Creek,
which bordered the Spokane Reservation. Judge Marshall Neill, the
same judge who presided in the Walton case involving the Colville
Tribe, published his decision on July 23, 1979.
The court was as favorable to the Spokane Tribe as it could be in
view of its recent decision in Walton. I11 Involved was an excellent
aquifer, half on and half off the reservation, which was 10 miles long
and two miles wide. In it about 23,000 acre feet of run-off from
bordering creeks was stored annually. Chamokane Creek constituted
the eastern boundary of the reservation and, while'it has a healthy
flow from the surface run-off in late winter and spring, during the
entire irrigation season it is exclusively fed by massive springs flowing
into it from the lower end of the aquifer. These springs created a
base summertime flow of about 30 cubic feet per second (CFS)
which flowed in a beautiful creek for about five miles over Chamokane Falls, through a gorge, and into the Spokane River on the
northeast corner of the reservation.
The state of Washington had granted irrigation permits to nonIndian irrigators to pump from both the creek and the aquifer. As a
107. Id.

108. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
109. [1978] 5 INDIAN L. REP. (AILTP) §F-43 (W.D. Wash. March 6, 1978).
110. No. 3643 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979).
111. See note 96 supra.
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result of the aquifer pumping, the base summer flow had declined;
pending and new water permits jeopardized the flow even further.
The tribe, in suing to curtail current pumping and prevent increased pumping, made two basic claims: (1) it had Winters rights to
irrigate about 8,000 acres of bordering and bench land whether it
irrigated or not, and (2) it had Winters rights to preserve the minimum flow up the creek to its former base flow of about 30 CFS, to
protect its use as a fishery and for esthetics and recreation. It claimed
the right to help maintain that flow without using aquifer waters to
irrigate its own land.
The primary defendant, the state of Washington, contended that
the tribe had minimal irrigation rights because most of the land was
timberland which the tribe and the United States could not have
intended to irrigate at the time the reservation was established in
1873, and did not intend to irrigate in any event with the Chamokane waters. It argued that the Winters rights were restricted to
irrigation and domestic and stock watering purposes and that the tribe
could not have Winters rights to preserve the minimum flow of the
creek.
As to the first contention the court said:
The court holds that the Tribe's decision not to use Chamokane
water for irrigation at this time, in order to preserve the esthetic and
fishery uses of the creek, does not abrogate the right to use reserved
water for irrigation at a later date. Implied reserved water rights are
open ended, and they need not be appropriated continuously and
put to1 12
beneficial use in order to be maintained. Arizona v. California.
It then concluded on this point:
In conclusion, this court recognizes the reserved water rights for
irrigation of lands within the Chamokane Basin on the Spokane
Indian Reservation in the following amounts. The tribe has a reserved right to a maximum of 23,694 acre-feet of ground or surface
water from the basin each year for irrigation of 7,898 irrigable acres
with a priority date of August 18, 1877, the date of the creation of
the reservation. For the 562 reacquired irrigable acres within the
Basin, the tribe has a reserved right to a maximum of 1,686 acre-feet
of water each year with a priority date of the date of reacquisition.1 13
Thus, in effect, the court awarded the tribe all of the water available
should the tribe want to use it for irrigation of its bench and bottom
lands. As to the state's second contention that the tribe had no
112. No. 3643, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979).
113. Id at9.
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Winters rights for fishery, etc., the court held: "The court finds that
the maintenance of the Creek for fishing was a purpose for creating
the reservation." 1 1 4 The court computed the amount of water
needed in an amount less than the tribe claimed but established a
maximum temperature measure as follows:
The court finds that the quantity of water needed to carry out the
reserved fishing purposes is related to water temperature rather than
simply to minimal flow. The native trout cannot survive at a water
temperature in excess of 680 F. The minimal flow from the Falls
into Lower Chamokane which will maintain the water at 680 F
varies, but it is at least 20 CFS. The court therefore holds that the
plaintiffs have a reserved right to sufficient water to maintain the
water temperature below the Falls at 680 F or less, provided that at
no time shall the flow past the Falls be less than 20 CFS. 1 ' s
Already boxed in by his earlier decision in Walton, the judge held
that except for their inferiority to the tribal rights, the state-issued
permits were valid and that the state retained jurisdiction to issue
permits both within or outside the reservation to non-Indians, "although it presently appears that the water from the Chamokane
Creek Basin may be over-appropriated in light of this adjudication,
and thus that the state may be creating false hope for persons permitted to apply for water ...

- 16

Thus Judge Neill, even more so than in Walton, remained mildly
assimilationist on this question of state jurisdiction. But in ruling for
the fisheries and for tribal Winters rights for land the tribe had no
present plans to irrigate, he advanced traditional Winters rights to a
higher plateau.' 1 7
CONCLUSION
While Walton is already under appeal to the Ninth Circuit and the
state promises to appeal Chamokane, it would seem that, in the field
of tribal water rights, Chamokane heralds the future. While allowing
state jurisdiction to grant permits or licenses to real or theoretical
surplus waters on reservations, the courts will expand Winters rights
to include fisheries, recreation, esthetics, commercial, and other uses
reasonably needed by the tribes even though those "purposes" were
not clearly conceived or intended at the time of the establishment of
reservations.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10. Motions to increase the minimum flow are pending.
116. Id at 15.
117. The Chamokane finding of July 23, 1979, was Judge Marshall Neilrs last decision.
Already terminally ill, he passed away on October 4, 1979.

